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Abstract: Land rental markets are critical in developing economies as they contribute to efficiency, equity 
and welfare gains to farmers involved under conditions of low transaction costs. Despite lack of policy 
consistency in Zimbabwe, A1 and A2 farmers have been involved in these land rental markets, albeit in an 
informal manner. This study sought to establish the determinants of farmers’ decision to take part in these 
informal markets. A survey was carried out in Mashonaland East province with a sample of 339 households 
selected through multi-stage sampling methods and data analysed using a bi-variate Tobit model. Results 
showed that combined together, the proportion of farmers involved in informal land rental markets are as 
much as those not participating. Determinants of renting-in were identified as gender, household income, 
permanent labour, cultivated area, tenure certainty, irrigable land size and crop diversification. Factors 
affecting renting-out decisions were age, permanent labour, irrigable land size and crop diversification and 
these results are not in any way different from findings from previous studies. The conclusion was that 
household characteristics and land endowments factors were strong in decisions to rent-in land while land 
endowments factors were dominant in decisions to rent-out land. Any future considerations for formalising 
land rental markets should consider these important factors having a bearing on land rental decisions.  
 




Land tenure has been recognised as an important institutional requirement towards full utilization of 
agricultural land (Hoken 2012). According to Awasthi (2009), there is a need for low-cost and supple land 
tenure systems to maximise on the productive use of land and to generate opportunities for agricultural 
based economies and increased welfare benefits. Under land tenure, usufruct rights in farmland are 
recognized as a key determinant to agricultural households’ poverty levels, food security and vulnerability to 
shocks (Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert 2016). Hagos and Holden (2013) postulated that land rental and sales 
markets were now very widespread even though traditionally they have not been regarded as features of 
land tenure systems. This misperception makes studies on land rental policy and market development and 
their impacts of considerable interest to both researchers and policymakers. Rahman (2010) noted that land 
rental demands less capital investments when compared to land sales and, in the process, providing superior 
inter-temporal tractability and giving a chance to owners working off-farm to benefit from on-farm wealth 
creation activities.  
 
Thus, land rental provides for a win-win situation for both the owners of land and potential farmers who can 
productively utilise the land. Vranken and Swinnen (2006) argued that in a typical Zimbabwean environment 
characterised by high risks and high transaction costs, defective credit and insurance markets as well as thin 
land sales markets, land rental markets provide a viable alternative to full utilization of land. Land rentals are 
pivotal in improving efficiency and equity in land utilisation and usufruct rights. Theoretically, by equalizing 
the marginal products of land among households with different land-labour resources, land rental markets 
subsequently enhance equity and agricultural productivity through transferring the land resource from less 
to more productive users (Feng 2008). The above literature serves to show that land rental markets are 
critical in promoting efficient utilisation of land as a resource and in reducing land usage disparities between 
the landowners and landless but potentially efficient farmers. Understanding of factors likely to influence 
participation in land rental markets is therefore critical in the promotion of land rental markets as a way of 
improving farm efficiency and equity.  
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Policy makers are able to enhance the success of the operation of rental markets by critically designing 
institutional arrangements in tandem with those factors that have a bearing on renting-in or renting out of 
the land (Reid 2016). According to Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert (2016), renting-in occurs when farmers 
utilise additional land from other farmers or those without land access lend from existing landowners while 
renting-out is when farmers allow potential farmers to utilise their land. Zimbabwe has a strong history with 
land reforms which dates back to pre-independence (Moyo and Chambati 2013). Four distinct phases of land 
reforms can be alienated, namely land discrimination on the basis of race (1930-1979), the willing buyer 
willing seller (1980-1989), the government first refusal of the right to land (1990-1998) and the fast track 
land reform program (FTLRP) from 2000 to 2010. The FTLRP led to two land tenure models; model A1 
mainly aimed at self-sufficiency food and nutrition security and limited marketed surplus production and A2 
model, which is a commercial production settlement scheme catering for small, medium and large-scale 
commercial farming (Matondi and Dekker 2011). However, most of these resettled farmers either lacked 
appreciation of farming as a business or were not adequately capitalised to undertake farming activities. As a 
result, agricultural production plummeted in the country with the country resorting to food imports from 
once being the breadbasket of Southern Africa (Moyo and Chambati 2013).  
 
By 2003, approximately 222,000 ha of land was under cultivation, implying a decrease of about 50% 
compared to the period prior to FTLRP, with tobacco, maize, soybean and wheat being the most affected. Beef 
declined to a fifth of the year 2000 levels, milk by 36%, poultry by 25% and piggery by 70% during the same 
period (Moyo 2007). In 2007, the government introduced land rentals aimed at encouraging productive use 
of the land. The rentals were set at US$15 for A1 farmers irrespective of the size of land and US$5 per hectare 
per annum for A2 farmers (Government of Zimbabwe 2016). In the aftermath, resettled farmers began to 
have private arrangements to rent-out and rent-in land in light of required government rental payments, with 
potential tenants being both former white commercial farmers and indigenous blacks. A study by Matondi 
and Dekker (2011) in Shamva showed the prevalence of renting in/out among A2 farmers at 18% compared 
to A1 farmers at 7% and 3-tier farmers at 4%. The study also concluded that some farmers were multiple 
owners of land, with some giving their plots to children or relatives, in some cases bartering for agricultural 
produce share. While the majority of A1 and A2 farmers were renting-out land without any authority 
(informal), some have entered into formal partnership arrangements with tenants and some have allocated 
resettled land to relatives.  
 
Another study by Scoones et al. (2011) in Masvingo showed that A1 and A2 farmers experienced an influx in 
cattle holdings as part of sharing (kuronzera) arrangement. Communal farmers failing to get adequate grazing 
areas for their cattle would give their friends or relatives with good grazing pastures cattle to keep. In return, 
the resettled farmers were allowed to use the cattle for both household and farming activities and sometimes 
were offered a heifer as a token of appreciation. The existing land rental markets are mainly informal, with 
government indicating its illegality but turning a blind eye to the practices. The prevalence of the practice has 
increased after the adoption of the multi-currency system in 2009 and gazetting of land rental payments to 
the state, putting pressure on farmers to look for alternative income sources to pay for these rentals. This 
paper therefore aims to unravel the dynamics of informal land rental market participation in Zimbabwe, by 
analysing the determinants of land renting-in and renting-out decisions among resettled farmers in the 
province of Zimbabwe. The rest of the article is organised as follows; section 2 outlines the theoretical 
framework adopted in this paper. Section 3 and 4 give the research methodology and results plus discussions 
respectively, while Section 5 concludes the research article. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
Previous theoretical assessment studies (Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert 2016, Deininger and Jin 2009) have 
shown that there is the potential of rental markets in enhancing farm efficiency by bringing into equilibrium 
land and other factor ratios among different households even when other factor markets are not perfect. 
Household characteristics, land endowments and transaction costs associated with land rental contracts have 
also long been acknowledged in literature as important factors in the decisions to rent-in or rent-out land 
(Hagos and Holden 2013). Transaction costs arise due to the need to monitor tenants' behaviour, plus the 
renter's management practices and potential mismanagement. Additional transaction costs comprise the 
costs of bargaining, searching for partners, and enforcing contracts (Hagos and Holden 2013).  
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These types of transaction costs are particularly high in environments where land rights are not secure 
(Chamberlin and Ricker-Gilbert 2016) and where the land transfer is controlled (Kimura et al. 2011). Despite 
the apparent evidence of beneficial contributions of rental markets, well-established perceptions remain that 
land rental markets could contribute to land concentration and amplified poverty levels, which then justifies 
the need for close government policing of land rental markets. There are three ways in which smallholder 
farmers are impacted by land rental markets according to theory (Hagos and Holden 2013), namely equity, 
efficiency, and welfare. These ultimate outcomes are achieved within the context of moderating factors, which 
are governance (policy administration and macro-environment), farmer practices, land use as well as capital 
and land markets. Equity gains are achieved from the reallocation of land across households with varied 
assets, which process occurs in a way that likely equilibrates land and non-land factor ratios (Hagos and 
Holden 2013). The efficiency gains are achieved when land is transferred from less productive to more 




Study Area and Sampling: The study was conducted in Mashonaland East Province of Zimbabwe which has 
an estimated 326 825 households and an average household size of 3.1. Population density is 42 persons per 
square kilometre and 86% of the population is rural. There are 17 731 A1 and 4 700 A2 households 
(Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency 2012) and they are mainly concentrated in four out of nine districts. 
The other districts are mainly populated by communal farming areas. The province was selected for the study 
as it is one of three provinces in the country which had the highest number of FTLRP beneficiaries. Key 
informant interviews also revealed that land renting practices are relatively higher for A1 and A2 farmers in 
this Province compared to other provinces. The study was carried out through the survey method coupled 
with key informant interviews and focus group discussions. For calculation of sample size, the population was 
considered as all A1 and A2 households in Mashonaland East, which stands at 22 431 (Zimbabwe National 
Statistics Agency 2012). The main considerations made in calculating the sample size were the margin of 
error and the significance level. In order to calculate the sample size, the following formula was used (Lefever, 
Dal, and Matthiasdottir 2007). 
 
𝒏 =  
𝑿𝟐∗𝑵∗𝑷∗(𝟏−𝑷)
[𝑴𝑬𝟐∗(𝑵−𝟏)]+[𝑿𝟐∗𝑷∗(𝟏−𝑷)]
        [1] 
Where: 
 n = Sample size 
 X2 = Chi-square for the specified confidence level at 1 degree of freedom 
 N = Population Size 
 P = Population proportion (assumed at 0.5) 
 ME = desired Margin of Error (expressed as a proportion). 
 
Considering the given population and the aforementioned margin of error and significance level, a sample of 
size of 378 households was generated. The sample size was reduced to 339 after data cleaning. The sample 
was prorated for A1 and A2 farmers and for Goromonzi and Marondera districts, as these have highest 
resettlement beneficiaries. Multi-sampling methods were used to capture critical aspects of the study, with 
stratified sampling used to select particular A1 and A2 farmers, simple random sampling being used in 
selecting the wards and purposive sampling used for selecting those involved in renting-in and renting out. A 
questionnaire was used to collect household data while guides were used to collect key informant and focus 
group discussion data. Data from the survey was transcribed to CsPro 5 and analysed using Stata.  
 
Tobit Regression Model: Most of the studies on land rental market participation uses either Probit (Shifa 
2016) or Tobit models (Bizimana 2011, Hou, Huo, and Yin 2017, Rahman 2010). Those using Probit had a 
binary variable as the dependent variable while Tobit models tend to have a dependent variable that 
quantifies the extent of rental participation in terms of the size of the land. Following the study by Rahman 
(2010) this study also hypothesizes a chronological order of decision making where a farmer makes the 
decision first to get involved in land rent markets followed by the decision of the size of the transaction. A 
censored regression model (bivariate Tobit model) is regarded as the appropriate model to use to identify the 
determinants of renting behaviour.  
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Where participation observations (above and below limit) are taken into account. The bivariate model 
analyses renting-in and renting-out decisions within the same model and not as two separate models. The 
specific estimation is given as follows: 
yi = α0 + xiβ + ziγ + riδ + εi          [2] 
 
where: yi is the dependent variable; xi, zi, and ri are vectors of variables measuring household characteristics, 
land endowment characteristics, and transaction cost effects respectively; β, γ, δ are vectors of parameters 
related to the household characteristics, the land endowment characteristics, and transaction cost variables, 
respectively, and εi is an error term (Rahman 2010). The selection of the bi-variate Tobit model was based on 
extensive literature review and considerations for best fit models. Farmers renting-out land in most cases do 
not let all of it but remain with some land for their own production. A number of farmers also rent-in land not 
just as tenants but also own some of the land, which they were fully utilizing and therefore landlords are also 
tenants in some situations. Accepted reality is also that some farmers are multiple landowners in different 
locations (Matondi and Dekker 2011) therefore they might be tenants in some physical locations and 
landlords in others. Moreover, the data showed that there is a strong correlation between the amount of land 
rented-in and that rented-out, with Spearman’s rho value of -0.256 and a two-tailed significance (p<0.01). 
Consequently, a bi-variate Tobit model was used as opposed to separate models for renting-in and renting 
out. The factors used in the model and their explanations are given in table 1: 
 
Table 1: Tobit Model Variables 
Variables Explanation 
Land_rented_IN Land rented in per farm in Ha 
Land_rented_OUT Land rented out per farm in Ha 
Gender Gender of household head; 1=Male, 0 otherwise 
Marital status =1 if household head is married 0 otherwise 
Age Age of household head in years 
Num_Edu_yrs Number of years in formal education 
total_Hh_incom Estimated total income for a household per year in USD 
Total_F_members Total number of resident family members 
Permanent_labor Number of permanent labour 
Cultivated_area Size of cultivated area in Ha 
TenureCertainity Security of tenure=1, 0 otherwise 
Irrigable_landsze Size of irrigable land per farm in Ha 
Crop_Dive_Index Crop Diversification Index 0=complete specialization, 1=perfect 
diversification 
Setlmnt_A1 Type of settlement=1 A1 Model 0 otherwise 
Capital_value_Assets Value of farm capital assets 
Livestock_value_Assets Value of farm livestock assets 
 
Following the studies by Hou et al. (2017); Shifa (2016) and Rahman (2010) the variables that were included 
in the model were shown in the table as well as the explanations. The interpretation of the results was based 
on the signs of the coefficients and their likelihood to affect the decision to rent in or out. That likelihood is 
measured by the t-ratio and the significance of each variable is them measured using the t-test.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
Goromonzi district had 67.6% of the farmers while Marondera had 32.4%, reflecting on the distribution of 
beneficiaries in the two districts. The sampled farmers were all taken from a total of 8 wards covering these 
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two districts. Of the total sample, 78.5% were from A1 settlement model while 21.5% were from the A2 
resettlement model. Results showed that most of the households were male-headed (79.9%), while only 
20.1% was being headed by females. The majority of the households also were couples (82%), with 14% 
indicating that they were widowed. Agriculture was the main source of income for the sampled households 
(77%), followed by pensioners (8.8%) and formal employment (8.3%), while 4.1% was involved in informal 
trading activities. In terms of the land rental activities being involved, 51.3% was not involved at all in land 
markets (autarky). A combined 22.2% was involved in some way in renting-in activities, while 26.5% was 
involved in renting-out activities. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Considered in the Model: The factors that have been considered, which 
have a bearing on farmer’s decision to rent-in or rent-out land are shown in Table 2. These are categorised 
into farmers not involved in land rentals (autarky), renting-in and those renting-out. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Variables used in the Model   
Variable Autarky Renting-in Renting-out 
Setlmnt_A1 0.839 0.773 0.689 
Gender 0.816 0.773 0.789 
Marital status 0.833 0.773 0.833 
Age 55.672 57.813 58.656 
Num_Edu_yrs 9.584 10.040 9.533 
total_Hh_incom 9818.793 20993.333 95745.000 
Total_F_members 5.224 5.667 5.222 
Permanent_labor 1.126 3.147 3.211 
Cultivated_area 3.968 20.360 15.212 
Capital_value_Assets 5298.621 19452.427 16381.167 
Livestock_value_Assets 5983.753 4552.760 5996.178 
Tenure certainty 0.477 0.520 0.444 
Irrigable_landsze 4.608 23.408 33.542 
Land_rented_IN 0 19.636 0 
Rental_Amnt_IN 0 64.424 0 
Land_rented_OUT 0 0 20.988 
Rental_Amnt_OUT 0 0 75.581 
Crop_Dive_Index 0.805 0.700 0.796 
Source (Survey, 2017) 
 
Results in table 2 showed the means for the variables across the different farmer categories. For most of the 
variables, there appeared not to be much difference in their measurements. Also, permanent labour was 
lowest for farmers in autarky. Land farm size, cultivated area and capital assets were all lowest for farmers in 
autarky compared to those farmers either renting-in or renting out.  
  
Determinants of Renting-In and Renting-Out Land: The study used a bivariate Tobit model to understand 
the factors that have a bearing on farmer decision making to rent-in or rent-out land. The results of Tobit 
model analysis are shown in Table 3.   
 
Table 3: Determinants of Participation in Land Rental Markets (Likelihood Ratios) 
Variables (Land rented-in) (Land rented-out) 
   
Gender 5.974** -6.505 
 (2.781) (4.536) 
Married -2.992 3.301 
 (2.927) (4.655) 
Age 0.031 -0.239** 
 (0.072) (0.115) 
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Num_Edu_yrs 0.183 0.143 
 (0.186) (0.294) 
total_Hh_incom -0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Total_F_members -0.013 -0.824 
 (0.397) (0.633) 
Permanent_labor -1.418*** 3.155*** 
 (0.269) (0.433) 
Cultivated_area 0.415*** -0.014 
 (0.046) (0.073) 
TenureCertainity 3.521* 1.877 
 (1.953) (3.099) 
Irrigable_landsze 0.117* -0.239** 
 (0.063) (0.101) 
Crop_Dive_Index 7.204* 17.616*** 
 (3.844) (6.070) 






Observations 339 339 
Log likelihood =  -1572.492 
Wald chi2(11) =    218.26 
Prob > chi2   =      0.0000 
Source (Survey, 2017), Figures in parenthesis are standard errors 
 
The study used a bivariate Tobit model to analyse the factors influencing farmer decision making to rent-in or 
rent-out land. The farmers that were considered were only those that are involved in land rental markets, 
either renting-in or renting out. The log likelihood ratio, which is analogous of the F-test in multiple 
regression (p<0.01) was significant. The results in Table 3 showed that compared to women, the likelihood of 
renting-in land is increased 5.974 times if the household head is male. This result is significant at 5% level. 
According to Bert et al. (2015) men are likely to take risks and seek more land for expansion purposes rather 
than be content with the allocated land, when compared to female heads of households. In addition, results 
have also shown that a significant number of households not allocated land but participating in rental 
markets were male-headed. The findings contrast that of Shifa (2016) who concluded that males are less 
likely to be involved in renting-in compared to their female counterparts. Ensuring more certainty to land 
rental markets through government policy such as formalising the markets might provide possible solution 
towards encouraging female-headed households to participate in these markets. A lower income has the 
effect of not changing much the likelihood of a farmer renting-in land. This is significant at 1% level of 
confidence. Given statistics that have shown that 67% of households depend on agriculture for their income, 
renting-in therefore provided a means through which farmers could increase their household incomes.  
 
Also, an increase in permanent labour by one unit reduced the likelihood of a farmer renting-in land by 1.418 
points. In production economies (Rahman 2010), farmers who have more permanent labour are mostly those 
with higher levels of productivity. As such they are likely to seek more land to rent in. The results therefore 
were a deviation from this expected norm. A possible explanation for this deviation is that farmers who were 
capital intensive (less labour) were more likely to seek more land (renting-in) in order to achieve economies 
of scale from the available capital. Another reason could be that those farmers who were renting-in but do not 
have land of their own (consequently fewer permanent workers) were more involved in renting-in than those 
allocated land by the state. Indeed Moyo (2016) argued that farmers involved in renting-in activities tend to 
have reduced number of permanent workers. An increase in cultivated area by one unit (hectare) is likely to 
increase the likelihood of renting-in by 0.148 points. A farmer with a higher hectarage of cultivated land was 
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more likely to be fully utilizing the landholding and be more efficient by taking advantage of economies of 
scale (Rahman 2010).  
 
Therefore, such a farmer was likely to rent-in more land after fully utilising all allocated land and then start to 
look for underutilized land among fellow farmers. Even for those farmers renting-in but not owning any land, 
participation in rental markets required that a higher hectarage of land be devoted to production to 
compensate for the rentals being charged by landlords if the enterprise was to remain profitable. The results 
of this study contrasted those of Rahman (2010) and Amare and Beyene (2015) which showed that lower size 
of cultivated land determined renting-in decisions. However, it is noted that for both Bangladesh and Ethiopia 
where the studies were done, the average size of land is about 3 hectares or less, which is far lower than what 
A1 and A2 farmers are allocated in Zimbabwe. This probably explains the differences in the results obtained 
in this study. Results presented in Table 3 also showed that perceptions of tenure security increased the 
likelihood of renting-in land. For those farmers without land and who were renting-in, perceptions of tenure 
certainty probably referred to their contractual agreements with the landlord, and not necessarily state 
tenure certainty. For those who were in investment partnerships, tenure security is enhanced by the formal 
agreements which were approved by the Ministry of Agriculture, reducing possible contractual violations in 
the process.  
 
This result was however different from the findings by Shifa (2016) who observed no significant effect of 
tenure security in renting-in decisions. It is important to note that culture and social capital play an important 
role in production (Hou, Huo, and Yin 2017). Among those nations where private tenure has never been 
adopted, tenure security is enhanced by the time period one has been on the farm more than the 
documentation giving one access to land (Shifa 2016). Hence in such nations as Ethiopia, tenure certainty 
might not be important, while it is important in the Zimbabwean context. According to Bizimana (2011), a 
strong secured tenure reduces transaction costs associated with land rentals and in the process encourage 
participation in rental markets. Increasing the size of irrigated land by a hectare increases the likelihood of 
participating renting-in markets by 0.117 points. Irrigable size of land has the effect of increasing the 
probability of being involved in land renting-in. Where farmers had irrigable land, the risk of production is 
reduced, and it is expected that once irrigable land is available, then farmers become more interested in 
renting-in the land. Also, farmers who normally purchase irrigation facilities are resource endowed farmers 
who normally are more likely to seek more land for renting-in. The findings however differed from that of 
Rahman (2010) and Hou, Huo, and Yin (2017) which showed that irrigable land has no effect on renting-in 
decisions.  
 
The decision by a farmer towards complete specialization in crop production as indicated by the crop 
diversification index had the effect of increasing the likelihood of renting-in land by 7.204 points. One of the 
tenets of commercial agriculture is specialization in limited enterprises (Rahman, 2010)). Farmers with a 
commercial approach to farming were more likely to seek more land to expand on production (Amare and 
Beyene 2015). It is therefore possible that farmers with such an orientation were inclined to seek more land 
for renting-in. A higher diversification index implied a propensity to specialize and consequently more 
demand for larger portions of land to practice agricultural production and hence renting-in behaviour. It is 
evident from the analysis that gender, household income and number of permanent labourers are household 
characteristics affecting the decision to rent-in land. Cultivated area, irrigable land size and crop 
diversification index represented land endowment factors while tenure security was a measure of transaction 
costs associated with the decision to rent-in land. 
 
Determinants of Renting-Out (lessor) Decisions: The results of determinants of renting-out land showed 
that age, irrigable land size, crop diversification and permanent labour were significant factors. The first two 
factors were significant at 0.05 level of confidence while the last two were significant at 0.01 levels. It can be 
deduced that household characteristics and land endowments were the determining factors for farmer’s 
decision to rent-out land. A decrease in age by one unit had the effect of increasing the likelihood of being 
involved in land rental markets by 0.239 points. Age is a culmination of the level of risk tolerance, agility to 
farm and farming experiences. Young farmers were more likely to take the risks of renting-out land if they 
were not fully utilizing it (Hou, Huo, and Yin 2017). Risk taking is naturally higher for the younger generation 
and in the face of conflicting political statements from policymakers, it was expected that young farmers were 
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more involved in renting- out land compared to their older generation (Moyo 2016). The younger generation 
also does not have the capital to be fully engaged in agriculture (Matondi and Dekker 2011).  
 
Furthermore, they constitute a large portion of the economically active group, preferring to seek formal 
employment in industry, thereby exhibiting a higher propensity towards unutilized, rented-out land. The 
results were supported by those of Masterson (2007); Amare and Beyene (2015); Nyangena (2014), who 
reported a significant and negative impact of age but contrasted with the findings of Bizimana (2011), whose 
conclusion was that age does not have a significant influence on the decision to rent-out land. The differences 
could have been accounted for by differences in the household characteristics. An increase in permanent 
labour by one unit also increased three times the probability of the farmer renting-out land. An increase in 
the irrigable land size by a unit also decreased the likelihood of a farmer renting-out land by 0.239 points. 
Increase in irrigable land size allowed the farmer to be efficient by maximizing output on a given piece of land 
(Hou, Huo, and Yin 2017). Hence, farmers were unlikely to rent-out land where there were irrigation facilities 
(Hou, Huo, and Yin 2017). Irrigation equipment was also expensive, and renting-out increased the risk of 
theft and misuse, hence the reluctance to rent-out irrigable land. This means that farmers who had irrigation 




Increased specialization in crop production (crop diversification index) had the effect of increasing the 
probability of a farmer participating in renting-out of land by 17.6 points. These results were supported also 
by (Tikabo & Holden, 2004)) but contrasted by the findings of a study by Rahman (2010). A farmer practising 
specializing is likely into commercial production and is therefore most probably to have a very limited 
amount of land to rent-out. The paper was aimed at understanding the determinants of the decisions to 
rent-in or rent-out land among A1 and A2 farmers. The bi-variate Tobit model results showed that the 
decision to rent-in land was influenced by gender, household income, permanent labour, cultivated area, 
tenure certainty, irrigable land size and the crop diversification index, which were statistically significant. 
Previous studies have shown no particular trend on the impacts of these variables on the renting-in decision. 
On the other hand, age, permanent labour, irrigable land size and crop diversification index significantly 
influenced the decisions to rent-out land. As with renting-in, literature has not shown any consistent 
tendencies for these variables. The conclusions were that household characteristics, land endowments and 
transaction costs significantly influenced renting-in decisions, while renting-out decisions were influenced 
more by household characteristics and land endowments. It is recommended that to improve land rental 
market participation, the following factors should be enhanced; income generation activities, promotion of 
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